“The church says the earth is flat, but I know that it is round, for I have seen the shadow on the moon, and I have more faith in a shadow than in the church.”
Ferdinand Magellan
The approval by General Petraeus of a U.S. Marine tank company to Afghanistan, after nine years of combat operations, generated lots of media buzz, recalling the rusted hulks of Soviet tanks from that ill-fated adventure. It also seemingly ups the ante for U.S. involvement, clashing with the president’s desire for a near term withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the real story is the retreat from counterinsurgency doctrine championed by General Petraeus and the attendant “process focused” mindset of military officers.
Sometimes less is not more. Tanks are part of the ground forces toolkit and their employment should be unremarkable. U.S. strategists painted themselves in a corner by advocating a counterinsurgency approach that featured dismounted patrolling and minimizing civilian casualties. Policy makers unfortunately further dictated capabilities commanders could bring to the fight, reminiscent of LBJ pouring over maps and picking bombing targets in North Vietnam. Mounting U.S. and coalition casualties and the fact Canadian and other coalition forces already employ tanks in Afghanistan made the move easier. But why the Marines and not the Army?
In Helmand province where the Marines operate there are better fields of fire, less relief and chance of armor ambush by Taliban with rocket propelled grenades. In other words, good tactical reasons to employ tanks. The Marines are also the smaller ground force and less encumbered by bureaucracy and group think than the Army. This almost always equates to flexibility. It was U.S. Marines that set and first exploited conditions of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq.
No understanding of the U.S. Army is complete without appreciating its obsession with doctrine. The training and doctrine command (TRADOC), headed by a four star general and employing thousands of soldiers and civilians, is responsible for the bulk of Army thinking. It’s central brain is the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which trains officers in doctrinal art and is commanded by a three star general. (Note: if you’re looking for fat in the defense budget, here’s a good place to start.) Every day army life is infused with the application of doctrine to standard operating procedures at all echelons. In an essentially linear approach to life’s complexity, this process focus, while satisfying to many senior leaders, comes at the cost of widespread “conventional” thought. Thus, the “real world,” or the concept of context, becomes an abstraction only understood through an “accepted” process. For example, the mission analysis methodology METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available and time) is merely a tarted up term for context. Does an army planner really need to be told that he operates with real life constraints?
Consider the current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine now in vogue, written by Petraeus and his Jedi Knights at Fort Leavenworth. These lessons learned from Iraq now serve as tactical and operational guidelines for our forces in Afghanistan. One might ask how a document written for Iraq can apply to a different place, people, culture, etc? How can any document address the non-linear dynamics, or almost infinite contingencies U.S. forces may encounter in the future?
In a defense related forum I’m privy to, debate centers around whether doctrine supports tanks in counterinsurgency. That is disappointing. Most military people support doctrine as an essential point of departure. Wrong. A good education and experience is a point of departure. How about doing what works and stop wasting time with doctrine.
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